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2 
Introduction  
Yugoslavia existed as federation of six socialist republics since the end of the 
Yugoslav Civil War (1941–1945) until its violent dissolution in the 1990s. This 
federation was ruled by one man, a socialist dictator named Josip Broz Tito (1945-1980) 
under whose broad policy of "Brotherhood and Unity" the ethnic component of the Civil 
War never officially entered the history books in the former Yugoslavia. Even so, the 
butchery committed by all parties—the German and Italian occupiers, the Ustasha 
(Croatian fascists), and the Chetnik and Partisan resistance movements—was not 
forgotten. The lack of reconciliation in the years after the Civil War drove a wedge 
between the Yugoslav peoples, and, bereft of any credible information, the Yugoslav 
public was misled by self-serving politicians during the decade after Tito’s death into 
violent ethnic nationalism, thus splintering the Yugoslav state. A careful examination of 
the rhetoric employed by former Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic, in the years 
between 1987 and 1992, when compared to recent scholarly investigations into the actual 
events of the Yugoslav Civil War of the 1940s,1
                                               
 1 This paper will only include the analysis of those speeches that are available in English-language 
transcripts. Doubtlessly, however, a closer examination of Serbo-Croatian sources would show similar 
patterns in Milosevic’s rhetoric. Recent investigations of the Yugoslavia during its civil war between 1941 
and 1945 have focused on the examination of primary source material that I am unable to access. This 
material includes, but is in no way limited to, German, Italian and British war archives, personal 
testimonies of survivors of the Yugoslav Civil War, as well as personal and diplomatic correspondence.  
 will show that the creation of an official 
history (by Tito’s government) that ignored the ethnic dimension of the War left that 
aspect of the conflict available to be used as a tool for ethnic nationalism after Tito’s 
death in 1980. This maltreatment of history—by Tito and by the nationalist leaders that 
came to power in the late 1980s—demonstrates the need for reconciliation between the 
participants of an ethnic war and a balanced scholarly discourse concerning the knowable 
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facts of the event. This examination will be preceded by some comments about the 
context of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, a brief historical overview of the region, and an 
introductory analysis of the rise of ethnic nationalism before the death of Tito.  
  
Context of the Problem 
On March 11, 1990, Lithuania declared its independence from the Soviet Union, 
thus beginning the disintegration of the socialist federations of Eastern Europe. By 
August of 1991 most of the former soviet republics had done the same, all with limited 
violence. On January 1, 1993, Czechoslovakia peacefully divided itself along ethnic lines 
in what became known as the “velvet divorce.” Therefore, in the early 1990s following 
the end of the cold war, Yugoslavia was one of the three multi-ethnic, formerly socialist 
states to undergo division.2 How then can the violence that accompanied the dissolution 
of Yugoslavia be explained when the same process was experienced elsewhere with 
relative non-violence? The mechanisms by which the changes were brought about differ. 
In the two “peaceful” cases just mentioned, ethnic nationalism surfaced because of the 
fall of socialism, whereas the research presented in this paper indicates that in Yugoslavia 
ethnic nationalism actually brought about the fall of the socialist political institutions.3
                                               
2 Gojko Vuckovic. “Failure of Socialist Self-Management to Create a Viable Nation-State, and 
Disintegration of the Yugoslav Administrative State and State Institutions,” East European Quarterly 32, 
no. 3 (1998): 353. 
  
 3 Omer Fisher notes in his chapter of New Approaches to Balkan Studies titled “Transition and 
Disruption in Yugoslavia in Comparative Perspective” that “Of the formerly communist countries that 
experienced a change in political regime starting from the eighties, all socialist federations broke up, and 
none of the unitary states collapsed. Furthermore, the disintegration of these federations produced an 
almost one-to-one correspondence between republics of the federations and new independent states.” In 
this chapter Fisher examines the differences between the three cases of Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and 
Czechoslovakia. He concludes that the violent transition in Yugoslavia is due to the particulars of the 
liberalization phase of Yugoslav politics, the discontinuous nature of this transition, and the “degree of 
violent center-periphery mobilization.” He provides valuable insights into the nature of socialist 
federations, but does not address the ethnic dimension of the Yugoslav conflict, the very dimension that I 
believe accounts for the violent conflict between the Serbian center of Yugoslavia and its multi-ethnic 
  
4 
It is significant to note that unlike other socialist states whose governments 
carried on after the decline of their initial socialist dictators, Yugoslavia proved unable to 
weather the transition from Tito to another executive leader or group of leaders. Perhaps 
this speaks volumes of Tito as a leader of consummate political skill. More likely, 
however, it attests to Yugoslavia’s succession problem and its lack of ideological rigidity 
even at the highest levels of republican leadership. As a matter of comparison, Soviet 
socialism, at least until the ascension of Gorbachev in 1985, was associated with a high 
degree of centralism and party leadership. Even in the later stages of its development 
there remained a dogmatic element associated with the leader of the Communist Party. 
The Yugoslav League of Communists (YLC) incorporated no such dogmatism. Gojko 
Vuckovic, a respected scholar who specializes in international politics, notes that the 
YLC made efforts during Tito’s reign to set policies and pursue socialist ideals, but the 
“inconsistency in formulation and interpretation of the Yugoslav nation led to the endless 
adjustment of Yugoslav political and administrative institutions.”4
 
 The most important of 
these adjustments were permanent revisions of the Yugoslav constitution between 1948 
and 1974 that systematically transferred political and economic power away from the 
central government to the constituent Republics. Essentially, Tito’s death marked the end 
of the last vestiges of a strong central government in Yugoslavia. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
periphery. For more on Fisher’s argument, see: Omer Fisher “Transition and Disruption in Yugoslavia in 
Comparative Perspective” in New Approaches to Balkan Studies ed. Keridis, Elias-Bursac, and 
Yatromanolakis (Everet, Massachusetts: Fidelity Press, 2003), 149-82. 
4 Ibid., 374. 
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Methodology 
This study is divided into two parts. The first is a brief overview of the history of 
Yugoslavia and nationalism in Yugoslavia and the second is a textual analysis of English 
language transcripts of several speeches by Slobodan Milosevic prior to 1993. The 
overview draws upon a broad range of secondary source material published by respected 
authorities in the field of Yugoslav studies. Incorporated into the first part is a more in-
depth historiography of Serbian nationalism that focuses on a number of secondary 
sources published since 1990. This paper does not, however, address most of the 
sensationalist literature that flooded the market with the outbreak of the worst violence in 
Europe since the Second World War.5
Anderson defines a nation as “an imagined political community—and imagined as 
both inherently limited and sovereign.”
 The analysis of Milosevic’s speeches focuses on 
identifying how accounts of historical events were used to inspire nationalist sentiments 
among Serbs. My analysis is predicated upon Benedict Anderson’s theory of nationalism. 
6
It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of 
their fellow members…imagined as limited because even the largest of them, 
encompassing perhaps a billion human beings, has finite, if elastic boundaries beyond 
which lie other nations…imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age 
in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-
ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm…[and] imagined as community because, regardless 
 This powerful statement includes no less than 
four important concepts that describe the character of nationalism: imagination, 
limitation, sovereignty, and community. Anderson explains each of these in turn. 
                                               
 5 The review article “Instant History” by Gale Stokes and some of his colleagues was instrumental 
in weeding through the mountain of literature that has been published about Yugoslavia in the years 
immediately following the outbreak of war in the 1990s. Stokes et al discriminate on the basis of the 
credentials of the various authors and the academic rigor with which they pursued their works. They 
generally speak poorly of most of the books written by journalists who had no prior experience in 
Yugoslavia prior to the 1990s. Most of the sources in my historiography of Serbian nationalism were 
selected based upon the recommendations of this article. Gale Stokes et al. “Instant History: Understanding 
the Wars of Yugoslav Succession” Slavic Review 55 no. 1 (1996). 
6 Benedict Anderson. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (Norfolk: Thetford Press, 1983), 15. 
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of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always 
conceived as a deep horizontal comradeship.7
 
 
In other words, the idea of belonging to a nation is a recent and constructed concept. 
Integral to this concept is the notion of the “Other,” those that lie outside the bounds of 
the nation. The Other may be (but does not necessarily have to be) one who speaks 
another language, one with different colored skin, the people living on the other side of a 
mountain, or any other arbitrary characteristic. Historically, however, language and 
ethnicity have been important factors in the defining of imagined communities. Along 
with Anderson’s succinct explanation reproduced above, one additional aspect of his 
theory is particularly applicable to the Serbian situation—essentially, nationalism maybe 
employed—usually by elite members of society—as a means of legitimizing the state.8
 
 
This is known as “official nationalism” and it has been used extensively in Yugoslavia in 
the latter half of the twentieth-century. 
 Historical Overview 
 Yugoslavia is located on the Balkan Peninsula, a region that has been divided and 
contested for centuries. It marked the geographical division of the eastern and western 
halves of the Roman Empire as early as the fourth-century A.D. Here the dominions of 
Catholicism and Orthodoxy met, and Islam became a major influence, as well, with the 
invasion of the Ottoman Empire in the fourteenth-century. Germans mingled with Slavs, 
especially in the northern regions of Croatia and Slovenia, and modern Bosnia-
Herzegovina marked the uneasy frontier between the Ottomans and the Hapsburgs. More 
recently still the nation of Yugoslavia stood precariously between the Cold War 
                                               
7 Ibid., 15-16. 
8 Ibid., 145. 
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superpowers (physically as well as ideologically, to a certain degree).9 Even without any 
additional information, it would be reasonable to accept that a region divided in so many 
different ways for such an extended period of time with relatively brief interludes of 
autonomy would be prone to political and ethnic strife, and many western observers of 
the 1990s dissolution point to this factor to explain the violence and ethnic cleansing. A 
more in-depth chronological overview, however, will show that there is no record of 
large-scale inter-Slavic conflict and that ethnic wars and genocide are a product of the 
twentieth-century.10
 Autonomy was first secured in the region by Christianized Serbian principalities 
that wrested their independence from a decaying Byzantine Empire in the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries A.D. At its height under Stevan Dušan (1331–1355), the original 
Serbian Empire encompassed Macedonia, Albania, Epirus, and Thessaly, as well as parts 
of Bulgaria and present-day Serbia.
  
11 Its independence, however, was short lived. On 
June 28, 1389 (St. Vitus Day) the Serbian Empire lost the Battle of Kosovo to the 
encroaching Ottoman Empire, under which it would remain until the nineteenth-
century.12
                                               
9 Dusko Doder. “Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds.” Foreign Policy 91 (1993): 5. 
 This battle is remembered by Serbs as one of the most important events in their 
history, certainly the most important to occur before the twentieth century. Many poems 
and legends depict the Battle of Kosovo as a crushing military defeat, but it is almost 
10 In spite of these historical divisions most serious scholars do not agree with the “Ancient ethnic 
hatreds” argument to explain the cause of the recent wars in the former Yugoslavia. Arguing against age-
old hatreds are scholars such as Christopher Bennett, Jonathan Gumz, Gojko Vuckovic, and Susan 
Woodward. For more information see Bennett, Christopher. Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course 
and Consequences (London: Hurst & Company), 1995. Jonathan Gumz, “German Counterinsurgency 
Policy in Independent Croatia, 1941-1944,” Historian 61, no. 1 (1998): 33-51. http://search.epnet.com/ 
login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=1355044 (accessed April 1, 2005). Gojko Vuckovic, “Failure of 
Socialist Self-Management.” Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold 
War (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995). 
11 Mojmir Križan, “New Serbian Nationalism and the Third Balkan War,” Studies in East 
European Thought 46 (1994): 47.  
 12 See: Appendix A “Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia, and the Ottoman Empire, 14th-15th centuries.” 
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universally regarded by Serbs as a moral victory. It is remembered as the battle in which 
Serbia defended European culture against the Muslim invaders. Additionally, the Battle 
of Kosovo has become the subject of Serbian mythology through the creation of 
innumerable commemorative ballads. In the mythological account, the leader of the 
Serbian armies, Tsar Lazar, was given the choice between an earthly crown and a 
heavenly one. The former would be his if he allowed his forces to crush the invading 
Turks, the latter if they willingly accepted defeat. Legend says that he chose the kingdom 
of the heaven.13
 As the Ottoman Empire began to decay, Serbia once again managed to secure 
autonomy with the expulsion of the Turks in 1862.
 
14 Serbia survived as an independent 
kingdom until the outbreak of the First World War. Afterwards, Croatian and Slovene 
desires for independence from the Austro-Hungarian Empire loosely corresponded with 
Serbian desires for the creation of a Greater Serbian Nation that would include all of the 
region’s linguistically similar populations. On December 1, 1918 the Kingdom of the 
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes—renamed the “Kingdom of Yugoslavia” in 1929—was 
created.15
                                               
 13 John Matthias. The Battle of Kosovo: Serbian Epic Poems trans. John Matthias and Vladeta 
Vuckovic (Athens: Swallow Press/Ohio University Press, 1987), http://www.kosovo.com/history/battle 
_of_kosovo.html#s02 (accessed May 17, 2005). 
 Although these three peoples were all of the same Slavic race, considerable 
cultural differences existed. Croats and Serbs shared the same language, but wrote in 
different alphabets—the former in Latin, the latter in Cyrillic. Additionally, these two 
ethnic groups had sharply divergent cultural traditions—the Serbs had spent nearly half a 
millennium under the dominion of a Muslim (Ottoman Turkish) empire, while the Croats 
14 Križan, “New Serbian Nationalism,” 49. 
15 See: Appendix A, “East Central Europe, 1918-1923,” and “Yugoslavia in the 20th Century, to 
1941.” Also note: “Kingdom of Yugoslavia” is literally translated as the “Kingdom of the Southern Slavs.” 
See: Helmut Konrad. “Historical Perspectives on Ethnic Conflict in Central Europe,” The History Teacher 
25 no. 4 (1992): 447.  
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spent a similar period under Catholic (Hapsburg-Austrian) influence. Perhaps most 
importantly, however, Serbs were traditionally Orthodox Christians whereas Croats were 
predominantly Roman Catholic.16 The Slovenes were conquered by the Hapsburgs in 
1278, and thus share a similar cultural history with the Croats even though the Slovenian 
and Croatian languages are distinct. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia also included 
substantial regional minorities of ethnic Albanians, Hungarians, Montenegrins, and 
Macedonians emphasizing the arbitrary nature of the borders drawn at the end of the First 
World War. In this initial formation of the southern Slavic state, often known as the 
“First Yugoslavia,” Serbia was the only province that had been an autonomous state in 
recent times.17 It is not surprising then that the first king of the new state would be 
Alexander, the former regent of Serbia.18
 Trouble soon beset the young kingdom as the opposing political interests of the 
Serbs and Croats made it clear that is would be impossible to agree upon a constitution. 
On June 28, 1921 Alexander, in the face of Croatian and Slovene opposition, pushed a 
proposed constitution through the parliament that provided for a highly centralized 
  
                                               
 16 Currently, in the context of a discussion concerning the peoples of the former Yugoslavia 
Orthodoxy is synonymous with Serbian as is Roman Catholicism with Croatian, yet this has not always 
been the case. At the time of the formation of the first Yugoslavia there were in fact Orthodox Croatians, 
Catholic Serbs, and Muslims of both ethnicities. See: Bogdan Denitch. Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic 
Death of Yugoslavia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 29-30. Additionally, Damir 
Mirkovic suggests that although the differences in alphabets and religions cannot be denied, factors such as 
urbanization, industrialization, the availability of secular education and interethnic marriages were blurring 
the distinctions between Serbs and Croats. Damir Mirkovic. “On Destruction and Self-destruction of 
Croatian Serbs: a preliminary draft for a study of genocide,” The South Slav Journal 20, no. 1-2 (1999): 29. 
 17 The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia of 1990 justifies the legitimacy of its existence by 
citing “a thousand-year-long national identity and state existence of the Croatian Nation.” It provides a 
chronicle of Croatian statehood from the initial creation of Croatian principalities in the seventh century 
through the constitutions of the Socialist Republic of Croatia (1963-1990) with the intent of justifying 
Croatia’s claim to full state sovereignty. For a reproduction of this chronicle in English see: “The 
Constitution of the Republic of Croatia: December 22, 1990” in Gale Stokes ed. From Stalinism to 
Pluralism: A Documentary History of Eastern Europe Since 1945, second ed. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 285-86. 
18 Richard Pintarich. “Yugoslav Sectionalism: Its Past and Reemergence,” Mankind 5 (1976): 36. 
See also: Appendix A, “East Central Europe, 1910.” 
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government and effectively established himself as a dictator. Little was accomplished 
under this system because the Croat opposition, under the leadership of Stephen Radic, 
refused to recognize the king’s authority under a constitution that had not been approved 
by a two-thirds majority. Nevertheless, Serbian hegemony persisted. This conflict gave 
rise in the late 1930s to the Croatian fascist movement, the Ustasha, which would later be 
installed as the ruling party of the Independent State of Croatia. 
 World War II brought untold suffering to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The war in 
Yugoslavia was not limited to the invasion of and resistance to the German and Italian 
armies. Civil war also erupted as a result of the removal of the central government. By 
1939 German occupation was accepted as an unavoidable reality, but easing the 
nationalistic tensions within Yugoslavia seemed like the best solution for minimizing the 
dismemberment of the state. With this in mind, and after much negotiation, Croatia was 
actually granted independence before the Second World War came to Yugoslavia. The 
Axis powers finally invaded Yugoslavia in 1941, and the Ustasha under Ante Pavelic 
quickly established ties with the invaders. The Croatian fascists freely collaborated with 
both the Germans and the Italians and were installed as the rulers of the Independent 
State of Croatia, which was expanded to include the Yugoslav province of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Hence, beginning in 1941, the Ustasha not only participated in the Nazi 
program to exterminate the Jews of Europe, but also began their own genocidal program 
directed at Serbs and other minorities within the Independent State of Croatia.19
                                               
 19 German officers stationed in the Independent State of Croatia and occupied Yugoslavia 
recognized the destabilizing effect that the Ustasha program of genocide had on the Serbian population and 
did everything in their limited power to stop it—not out of concern for those being murdered, of course, but 
rather for the sake of the stability of the occupied state. Hitler, however, did not share in his officer’s 
 Jonathan 
Gumz, a scholar specializing in the field of holocaust studies, suggests that  
  
11 
Not only would the genocide meet the Ustasha’s goal of an ethnically pure Croatian 
nation, but the Ustasha also believed that it would widen their small political power base 
by making all Croatians by virtue of their ethnicity complicit in the genocide.20
 
 
This process of systematic murder was carried out in concentration camps much as it was 
in Central Europe. The Ustasha killed some 45,000 to 52,000 Serbs and 8,000 to 20,000 
Jews in Jasenovac, the largest of these camps in Croatia. The same source places the total 
number of Serbs killed by the Ustasha somewhere between 330,000 and 390,000 and 
Jews around 32,000.21
  In Serbia another ultra-nationalist group, the Chetniks,
 
22 under the leadership of 
Draza Mihailović supported the Serbian government-in-exile. The Chetniks, based their 
resistance on the Serbian peasantry’s traditional pattern of armed self-defense. Village 
notables were relied upon to carry out resistance activities in the areas around their 
village. This strategy led to a resistance movement that was intimately acquainted with 
the local terrain, but ineffective at mobilizing for large-scale resistance activities.23
                                                                                                                                            
concern, and in an often cited statement with General Alexander Lohr maintained that the Croats were 
“only letting off a little steam” by killing Serbs. Gumz, “German Counterinsurgency Policy,” 4. Even more 
shocking is the evidence provided by Paul Hehn in his article “Serbia, Croatia and Germany 1941-1945” 
that Hitler may have “partitioned Yugoslavia to deliberately foster quarrels between national groups to 
enable him to dominate the area more easily.” Paul N. Hehn, “Serbia, Croatia, and Germany, 1941-1945: 
Civil War and Revolution in the Balkans,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 13, no. 4 (1972): 346. 
 At the 
other end of the political spectrum, Josip Broz Tito led the Partisans, a communist 
20 Gumz, “German Counterinsurgency Policy,” 2. 
21 Figures on the exact number of Serbs killed in the Ustasha program of genocide vary greatly, 
and are largely dependent upon the political motives of the source. Typically Serbian sources tend to 
maximize the casualty figures while Croatian sources minimize them. For this paper I have used the 
statistics compiled by the United States Holocaust Museum. For more information see: United States 
Holocaust Museum “Holocaust Era in Croatia 1941-1945: Jasenovac” http://www.ushmm.org/museum 
exhibit/online/jasenovac// (accessed April 14, 2005). 
 22 The name “Chetnik” had surfaced in recent times in connection with the Bosnian Serb guerillas 
operating during World War I, but Mihailović chose it as a name for his forces because of its symbolic 
reference to the highland guerilla bands that opposed Ottoman rule. These outlaws—alternatively known as 
klephts, haiduks, or haiduts—terrorized trade caravans, often with the support of local villages, during the 
Ottoman period and are remembered by rural Serbs as folk heroes. See: John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as 
History: Twice there was a country (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 201-02. Barbara 
Jelavich, History of the Balkans, vol. 1, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), 61. 
 23 Bogdan Denitch, “Violence and Social Change in the Yugoslav Revolution: Lessons for the 
Thrid World?” Comparative Politics  8, no. 3 Special Issue on Peasants and Revolution (1976), 467. 
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resistance movement. The most striking difference between the Partisans and the 
Chetniks was that while the latter was almost entirely composed of Serbs,24 the former 
actively included members of all Yugoslav ethnicities (although Serbs did compose the 
majority of their ranks) under Tito’s communist slogan “Brotherhood and Unity.” In 
addition to being a multi-ethnic resistance group, the Partisans formed a much more 
mobile force not tied to any particular area. Their leaders were not traditional authority 
figures, but rather were usually taken from the rural intelligentsia, especially from 
teachers schools.25 Additionally, the Chetniks engaged in relatively little active resistance 
compared to the communist Partisan resistance group led by Tito because they took the 
Germans threats of reprisals (and demonstrations thereof) very seriously.26 Eventually 
with allied assistance, the Partisans succeeded in liberating Yugoslavia—including the 
Independent State of Croatia—from Nazi and Ustasha occupation, and Tito established 
the YLC at the core of the new Yugoslav government under a plan of enforced national 
unity and tolerance.27
 It is widely accepted by many historians that without Tito’s charismatic 
leadership, Yugoslavia, which incorporated deep-rooted ethnic divisions, would not have 
existed for so long.
 
28
                                               
 24 In addition to Serbs, some Bosnian Muslim guerilla groups fell under the umbrella of the 
Chetnik movement. For more on this see Yeshayahu A. Jelinek, “Bosnia-Herzegovina at War: Relations 
between Moslems and Non-Moslems,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 5 no. 3 (1990): 282. 
 This argument gains more weight when it is considered that, after 
the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, Yugoslavia was an unaligned socialist state pursuing an 
 25 The Chetniks recognized this pattern of recruitment for the political commissars of the Partisan 
forces. According to Bogdan Denitch, this “explains the systematic murder by Chetniks of village 
schoolteachers and graduates of teachers’ schools in Serbia and Eastern Bosnia.” Denitch, “Violence and 
Social Change,” 467. 
26 Gumz, “German Counterinsurgency Policy,” 3. 
27 See: Appendix A, “Yugoslavia in the 20th century 1941-1989.” 
28 For example see Vuckovic, “Failure of Socialist Self-Management,” 374 or Fisher, “Transition 
and Disruption,” 169. 
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uncharted course of political development.29 This turned out to be a course leading to 
decentralization where Tito’s personal authority eventually became the only effective 
remaining element of the central government. Upon his death in 1980, the Yugoslav 
central government was too weak to contain the nationalist drives of its constituent 
republics. There had been no provisions made for the succession of leadership, and the 
presidency shared between the leaders of each of the republics proved completely 
ineffectual. Faced with the mounting pressures of ethnic nationalism in each of the 
republics and the reality of complete decentralization, the YLC dissolved itself following 
the first free elections in 1990 and was followed shortly thereafter by the complete 
collapse of the central government.30
 
 
Problems of Nationalism under Tito 
 During the Civil War of the 1940s, ethnic nationalism had undergone a 
transformation from the ideological to the violent and militant. This transformation was 
perhaps the most obvious threat to the stability of the Second Yugoslavia that emerged 
immediately after World War II. Tito’s policies sought to curb Serbian nationalism in 
particular, but a heavy burden of guilt was also placed upon the Croats for their 
fanaticism. As a method of legitimizing itself, Tito and the YLC tailored the national 
memory of the war to fit a strictly bilateral mold. The communist Partisans fought against 
elements of fascism. No distinction was drawn between the Ustasha, Chetniks, and the 
Nazis themselves. References to the Partisans use of violence and terror during and 
immediately after the war—for example, the killing of thousands of Chetnik and Ustasha 
                                               
29 For more information about the campaign to abolish Stalinist forms of rule in Yugoslavia see: 
Paul Shoup, “The National Question in Yugoslavia,” Problems of Communism 21 (1972): 19. 
30 Vuckovic, “Failure of Socialist Self-Management,” 374. 
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POWs31—was not allowed to be called into question and the media was censored to 
conform to Tito’s “Brotherhood and Unity” policy. These policies aimed at replacing 
ethnic nationalism, namely Serbian and Croatian, nationalism, with an all-encompassing 
Yugoslav nationalism.32
 The failure of the governments of both the First Yugoslavia and the Second to 
create an enduring Yugoslav nationalism—a sense of nationalism shared by all the 
citizens of the state—illustrates the relative importance of shared cultural memory as 
compared to language in the process of fostering nationalism. According to Benedict 
Anderson by the end of the First World War, “the legitimate international norm was the 
nation-state.”
 Unfortunately, aside from their unsuccessful experiences within 
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the republics that composed Yugoslavia had no similar 
history upon which to base a sense Yugoslav national identity. 
33
                                               
 31 Records of these murders are sketchy and are a matter of contention between Serbs and Croats. 
Nevertheless it seems that Partisan forces took charge of opposition forces that had fled to Austria to 
surrender to the British and disposed of them through a series of death marches. The attention paid in recent 
years to most infamous of these marches, the Bleiberg march, became a major contributor to Croatian 
nationalism in the 1990s. For more information on this see: Biljana Vankovska, “Military and Society in 
War-Torn Balkan Countries: Lessons for Security Sector Reform,” http://www.dcaf.ch/news/MISO/ 
Biljana.pdf (accessed May 19, 2005). 
 In Europe nation-states were typically formed in regions where the 
majority of the population spoke the same vernacular. Coincidentally, these were also 
regions that shared common cultural traditions (e.g. France, Germany, and later Italy). It 
is not surprising then that the First Yugoslavia was created out of two regions, Serbia and 
Croatia, where the majority of the population spoke the vernacular known as “Serbo-
Croatian.” The difference between Yugoslavia and other nation-states was that Serbia and 
32 Wolfgang Hoepken, “War, Memory, and Education in a Fragmented Society: The Case of 
Yugoslavia,” East European Politics and Societies 13, no. 1 (1999): 197-98. 
 33 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 104.  
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Croatia had very different cultural traditions.34 Croatia was essentially Austrian in 
culture, while Serbs had bitterly clung to their medieval heritage under Turkish 
domination for 500 years. This largely accounts for the instability of the first Yugoslavia. 
This cultural disparity was further amplified by the events of World War II. Thus, during 
the period of the Second Yugoslavia, the constituent republics had almost nothing in 
common besides a language and even that was not shared uniformly throughout the 
country.35
 Republican nationalism did not disappear after World War II nor were old 
grievances forgotten, but in Serbia nationalist sentiments were censored from the media 
in accordance with Tito’s “Brotherhood and Unity” policy. In spite of this censorship, 
anti-Croatian sentiments smoldered. Popular demonstrations in the 1980s attested to the 
fact that Serbia as a whole nursed a grudge against Croatia, its more sophisticated, 
industrialized, and seemingly ungrateful neighbor to the northwest. After all, Serbs 
remembered that it was they who had sacrificed the most in both World Wars to assure 
the autonomy of a Southern Slavic State. Many remembered the crimes committed by the 
 
                                               
 34 Yugoslavia also included significant minorities of peoples that did not speak Serbo-Croatian 
such as the Slovenes, Hungarians, and Albanians. This further contributed to the instability of Yugoslavia 
as a nation state. 
 35 It would be unfair to say that absolutely no one bought into Yugoslav nationalism. According to 
the census taken in 1991, 3 percent of Yugoslavia’s 23,528,230 people declared themselves as 
“Yugoslavs,”—that is to say that they refused to claim any particular ethnicity. Yet, if  Yugoslavs are 
considered as a minority they outnumber—of the other substantial minorities—only Montenegrins and 
Hungarians (2 percent each) and are less populous than Muslim Slavs (10 percent), Albanians (9 percent), 
Slovenes (8 percent), and  Macedonian Slavs (6 percent) to say nothing of Serbs (36 percent) and Croats 
(20 percent). On the other hand it should be taken into consideration that this census was taken after a 
decade of mounting ethnic nationalist sentiments which would have led individuals to declare an ethnicity 
other than Yugoslav. Census data from 1971 and 1981 provide at least superficial support for this claim. In 
1981 “Yugoslavism” was at a high of 5.4 percent of the total population, which is a considerable increase 
from just 1.2 percent in 1971. In other words, at least until the time of Tito’s death, the concept of a 
Yugoslav nationality was growing in popularity. Census figures for 1971 and 1981 taken from “Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” in LaborLawTalk Online Encyclopedia http://encyclopedia 
.laborlawtalk.com/Socialist_Federal_Republic_of_Yugoslavia#Demographics (accessed June 1, 2005). 
Figures for 1991 taken from “Yugoslavia: The People of Yugoslavia” in Encarta Online Encyclopedia 
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761567145/Yugoslavia.html (accessed May 29, 2005). 
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Ustasha and they resented the economic prosperity of Croatia. Furthermore, after the war 
in which mostly Serbian Partisan forces had secured the liberation of the nation, Serbia 
was territorially dismembered by the creation of the republics of Montenegro and 
Macedonia and the two autonomous republics of Kosovo and Voyvodina. Even after the 
loss of these traditionally Serbian territories, the republic of Serbia was still nearly twice 
as populous as the next largest republic (Croatia), but in all formulations of the 
government it would receive representation equal to that of any other republic. Especially 
troublesome to Serbian nationalism were the abuses perpetrated by ethnic Albanians 
against a shrinking minority of Serbs in the autonomous province of Kosovo—the most 
important location to Serbian culture since it was the site of their defeat by the Ottomans 
in the fourteenth century. 36
 The Croatians, however, enjoyed more liberty during the Tito era, and in the early 
1970s in particular there was a surge of Croatian nationalist sentiment. Stephen Anderson 
writing during this period noted that whereas Serbians were jealous of Croatia’s 
prosperity, “Croats have always chafed at what they consider to be exploitation by the 
poorer and more backward regions of Yugoslavia—i.e. Serbia Macedonia, Montenegro, 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina.”
  
37
                                               
36 Alex N. Dragnich, “The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia: The Omen of the Upsurge of Serbian 
Nationalism,” East European Quarterly 23, no. 2 (1989): 183-97. 
 It was due to mounting feelings of ethnic nationalism that 
Croatia persistently lobbied for republican participation in the central government. 
Eventually, the Yugoslav Federal Assembly passed constitutional amendments on June 
30, 1971 that provided for increased economic autonomy for the republics as well as 
guaranteeing participation in a joint presidential council that would replace Tito upon his 
eventual retirement. This constitutional reform sharply curtailed both the power and the 
37 Stephen S. Anderson, “Yugoslavia’s Future,” Current History 60, no. 357 (1971): 277. 
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authority of the federal government, limiting its authority primarily to international issues 
and relegating it to receiving “contributions” from the republics.38 Omer Fisher points 
that after the constitutional reform, decisions on all matters in the federal parliament 
became subject to the unanimous approval of all the Yugoslav republics, and that even 
“day-to-day economic decisions relied on the good will of each of the republics and 
provinces.”39
Many competences will be transferred from the Federation to the republics as a result of 
the adoption of the constitutional amendments. I think that this is good. However, there 
are also some people who, to be factual, by invoking the amendments, aim at closing 
themselves within their borders and establishing a closed market, that is, a market which 
would not be unified and this is a dangerous thing.
 The crippling side effect of this arrangement was that the central 
government was unable to react to economic crises. These changes, however, inflamed 
rather than assuaged Croatian nationalism and led to even greater demands for control 
over foreign trade, republican control of foreign currency earned, and outright economic 
independence. Tito’s speech broadcast from Belgrade on April 15, 1971 foreshadowed 
the problems that would besiege Yugoslavia with the adoption of the new constitutional 
amendments: 
40
 
  
Within two decades, Tito’s fears were more than realized. In the free elections, held in 
1990 for the first time since World War II, nationalist parties or coalitions won majorities 
in all of the Yugoslav republics. Then, in 1991 and beginning with Slovenia, the 
republics began to declare and forcibly assert their total independence as separate states.  
 
 
 
                                               
38 Shoup, “The National Question in Yugoslavia,” 25. 
 39 Fisher, “Transition and Disruption,” 161. 
40 Josip Broz Tito, “Socialist Amalgam for Federal Yugoslavia,” Tanjug broadcast from Belgrade 
April 15, 1971 in Shoup “The National Question in Yugoslavia” 28. 
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Historiography of Yugoslav Nationalism 
 Since the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, there has been a flood 
of scholarly works published on the subject. A popular point of inquiry—to which the 
topic of this paper attests—has been the connection between the rise of ethnic 
nationalism and the disintegration of the Yugoslav state. So far this study has advanced 
the argument that there is a direct causal relationship between increasingly nationalist 
republics and the secession of the same. While this is a widely shared position, it is not 
the only one. The following section gives a sampling of some of the scholarly arguments 
on this connection  
Gojko Vuckovic proposes that the system of “Socialist Self-Management” 
introduced into Yugoslavia in the 1950s was the primary contributor to the eruption of 
violent ethnic nationalism in Yugoslavia. He equates the process decentralization with the 
development of consciously ethno-nationalist republics. In other words, Vuckovic finds 
sufficient evidence that the process of nationalism began in the 1950, albeit slowly, and 
that the events of the 1990s are best seen as a continuation of the process of 
decentralization. The key event in this concept of Yugoslav disintegration is the death if 
Tito in 1980 at which time the central government ceased to be an effective institution. 
Vuckovic adds, however, that to this process of decentralization must be attached the 
additional consideration of an “unfavorable, divided, and inconsistent international 
community” in order to fully account for territorial breakup of Yugoslavia.41
 Michael Ignatieff believes that ethnic nationalism in Yugoslavia is an invented 
concept that creates false distinctions and fosters fear between largely similar groups of 
people who would ordinarily live in peace with one another. He argues that nationalist 
 
                                               
 41 Vuckovic, “Failure of Socialist Self-Management,” 353.  
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politicians, such as Milosevic and Tudjman, only adopted the nationalist position because 
communism stopped working. “Nationalist sentiment on the ground, among common 
people,” he says, “is a secondary consequence of political disintegration, a response to 
the collapse of the state order and the interethnic accommodation that made it possible.”42 
In this argument he minimizes the existence of nationalism during Tito’s reign and what 
he does acknowledge he attributes to the aging generation that survived the Ustasha 
genocide. To substantiate this claim he points to the growing rates or intermarriage, the 
uniform application of justice by local authorities, and the status quo of peaceful 
coexistence in most villages.43
 Also minimizing ethnic nationalism as the immediate cause of disintegration is 
Susan Woodward. She argues that “the real origin of the Yugoslav conflict is the 
disintegration of governmental authority and the breakdown of political and civil order.” 
She further states, “The conflict is not a result of historical animosities…it is the result of 
the politics of transforming a socialist society to a market economy and democracy.”
 
44 
Woodward points to the economic crisis of the 1980s as being primarily responsible for 
the destabilization of the country and considers nationalism to be a “dynamic” of the 
growing political instability. She considers nationalism to possess an “empty vessel 
character—[an] absence of program outside the insistence on political power for some 
imagined community.”45
                                               
 42 Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honor (Henry Holt: New York, 1998) 45. 
 Essentially, in Woodward’s view nationalism in the republics of 
the former Yugoslavia was little more than a banner under which adherents of diverse 
 43 For more, see: Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honor, especially, “The Narcissism of Minor 
Difference,” 34 – 71. 
 44 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 15. 
 45 Ibid., 224. 
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political ideologies—from both the far left and right—could gather to preserve their 
crumbling political power.46
 For Christopher Bennett, ethnic nationalism in Yugoslavia is a concept 
deliberately manufactured by the media in the 1980s in order to justify Serbia’s territorial 
ambitions. He maintains that a unified Yugoslav state was the best possible arrangement 
for the southern Slavs, and plays down interethnic tensions in both the Kingdom and 
Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia. Bennett credits Milosevic with the triggering the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia by revoking the autonomy of Kosovo in 1989 as part of a 
program to build a greater Serbia. This is a fairly narrow perspective of the conflict—the 
position that Serbia, and specifically Milosevic, is at fault for the failure of the Yugoslav 
experiment—but it represents a fairly popular position in academia, and a very common 
view held laypersons.
 
47 For example, Laura Silber and Allan Little fall in line with 
Bennett with their argument that the disintegration of Yugoslavia is due primarily to 
Serbian nationalism. Specifically they claim to “trace the origins of the war to the rise of 
Serb nationalism among Belgrade intellectuals in the mid-1980s, and the subsequent 
harnessing of nationalist rhetoric by Slobodan Milosevic.”48
 Closer to the position of this paper is Lenard Cohen. In his study of the break up 
of Yugoslavia he divides the problem into two specific issues. First, “why the ‘Second 
Yugoslavia’ (1945-1991) collapsed?” and second, “why [did] the disintegration of the 
 
                                               
 46 Integral to Woodward’s book, but somewhat outside the scope of this paper is her study of the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia as a foreign policy issue for the global political community. She points to 
differing conceptions of the nature of the conflict (to say nothing of its origins), either “the war was an act 
of aggression by Serbs against the legitimate government of a sovereign member of the United Nations.” or 
“that the Yugoslav and Bosnian conflicts constituted a civil war based on the revival of ethnic conflict after 
the fall of communism.” Ibid., 7. 
 47 Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse, vii-15. 
 48 Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: TV Books, 1995), 25. 
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federation [generate] so much violence and suffering?”49 Cohen, like Woodward, 
attributes the collapse of the Yugoslav state to the failures of its political leaders to 
reestablish a functional model for political and economic coexistence among the 
republics following what he calls the “pluralist revolution” of 1990. Part of this failure 
consisted of the amplification of an “elite-led ethnic nationalism,” but unlike Ignatieff, 
Cohen sees a difference between newly created ethnic nationalism and historically rooted 
ethnic tensions. He also acknowledges the role that foreign powers played in the 
disintegration, “particularly German and Austrian support for the secessionist goals of 
Slovenia and Croatia, and the ‘pasted together’ diplomacy exhibited by the United States 
and European Community.”50
 A perspective complimentary to many of the above arguments is that nationalism 
not only existed as a political policy, but that it was even institutionalized in the 
constitutions of the former Yugoslav republics. Robert Hayden argues that this 
“constitutional nationalism” was the solution adopted by the nationalist politicians 
elected in the free elections of 1990 to solve the problem of “combining practical politics 
 Cohen’s explanation of the violence associated with the 
disintegration boils down to the fact that ethnic tensions existed. Without these, 
nationalist political campaigns would not have sparked the violent conflicts between 
individual neighbors that characterized the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. He 
founds his claim for the existence of ethnic tensions on evidence very much like that 
presented in earlier sections of this paper. 
                                               
 49 Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia (San Francisco: Westview 
Press, 1993), 265. 
 50 Ibid., 266. 
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and nationalist ideology.”51
 
 This policy allowed the new states to manipulate the 
institutions of democracy to favor members of an ethnic group rather than the individual 
citizen, and, as Hayden points out, Croatia and Slovenia employed constitutional 
nationalism most liberally. This concept of nationalism gives considerable weight to the 
argument that ethnic nationalism moved through society from the top down—after all, 
most villagers were not involved in the drafting of the constitutions. Identifying the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia as a product dictated by the outcome of the 1990 elections 
further reinforces the idea that nationalist politicians should be considered most 
responsible.  
A Brief Account of Serbian Nationalism  
 Strictly speaking, the concept of nationalism developed in Europe slowly over the 
course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries but the nation-state did not become the 
international norm until after the First World War.52
                                               
 51 Robert M. Hayden “Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics” Slavic 
Review 51, no. 4. (1992) 654. 
 Nevertheless, a discussion of an 
imagined community among Serbs must begin much earlier. Following their defeat in the 
Battle of Kosovo in 1389, Serbs managed to maintain their linguistic traditions over the 
ensuing centuries of foreign occupation. What accounts for this is the fact that under the 
Ottomans, Serbian communities enjoyed the status of dhimmis, protected Christian or 
Jewish enclaves within Islamic states. Also, as Mojmir Križan—another scholar involved 
in the study of the history of Serbian nationalism—points out, “as a predominantly 
illiterate peasant population lacking an intellectual and political elite, Serbs did not 
 52 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 104. 
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develop a productive cultural exchange with their Islamic environment.”53 The Serbs 
clung bitterly to their language for almost five centuries of Ottoman rule. Thus, even 
before the advent of formal nationalism in Western Europe, Serbs imagined themselves 
as a subculture within the Ottoman Empire the defining characteristic of which was their 
vernacular. 54
 It is not surprising, then, that once they achieved independence as their own state 
in the nineteenth century the Serbs defined themselves according to linguistic (not 
geographical) lines, and extended Serbian nationalist ambitions to include the 
linguistically similar Croatian and Slovene regions of the Hapsburg Empire. A study of 
textbooks from this period reinforces the concept of language’s central role in the 
nationalist picture. A popular Serbian elementary history text from 1907, claimed the 
following: 
 
Nations are recognized by their language. However, many thousands of families who 
speak the same language and understand one another comprise one nation… But a nation 
is also identified by something else. For example, if you went far away, you would meet 
many people who did not speak our language, were not proud of Miloš Obilić, did not 
praise Kraljević Marko, did not celebrate our glories, did not attend church meetings as 
we do, and did not lament Kosovo. Frequently, they would not even know about these 
things. Consequently, people who speak the same language, who share the same national 
pride, and remember one another wherever they may be, who have identical customs are 
called a nation.55
 
 
In his study of South Slavic nationalism, Jelavich calls attention to the linguistic issue, 
but also stresses the importance of cultural practices and memory. Before proceeding to a 
discussion of these elements, it is worthwhile to point out that through his examination of 
                                               
53 Križan, “New Serbian Nationalism,” 48. 
 54 It should be noted, however, that both Serbian identity and language were intimately tied to the 
epic ballads that recalled the memory of the Battle of Kosovo. For a translation of these ballads, see: 
Matthias, The Battle of Kosovo. 
55 Ljub. M. Protić and Vlad D. Stojanović, Serbian Reader—Third Volume for the Fourth Grade 
of the Elementary Schools in the Kindgdom of Serbia. Seventh ed. (Belgrade: Državna štamparija, n.d.) 5; 
and Sreten Pašić and Milan Šević. Serbian Reader for the Secondary Schools—First Volume—For the First 
Grade. (Belgrade: Državna štamparija, 1902) 21 cited in: Charles Jelavich. “Nationalism as Reflected in 
the Textbooks of the South Slavs in the Nineteenth Century,” Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 
16, nos. 1-2 (1989): 18. 
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over 300 textbooks form the period prior to the First World War Jelavich determines that 
“Serbian textbooks concentrated exclusively on the Serbian nation, with few attempts to 
inform students about the Croats.”56 This certainly makes sense because Serbia was an 
independent kingdom and to annex the linguistically similar Croats would be seen as the 
creation of a Greater Serbia. His conclusions about the Croats within the Hapsburg 
Empire, however, communicate the Croatian belief that the best prospect for autonomy 
lay in the creation of a southern Slavic state in on equal terms with the Serbs. Specifically 
that “the Croatian textbooks stressed Serbo-Croatian linguistic and literary unity and 
included basic facts about Serbian history, religion, customs and traditions.”57
 Cultural memory has a strong connection with nationalism, not just in 
Yugoslavia. By making the participation in an event—or on a certain side of an event—
by one’s ancestors a requirement for constituency, a nation may further limit the number 
and type of people that are included in the imagined community. In general, war 
 In other 
words Croats viewed Serbs as separate people and potential partners in the creation of a 
Serbo-Croatian nation, whereas the Serbs viewed the absorption of the Croats as the next 
logical step in expanding their existing nation. This is a clear illustration of Benedict 
Anderson’s concept of nationalism in action. Croatian and Serbian textbook writers both 
imagined limited nation-states that included both Serbs and Croats, but they imagined the 
authority of the various ethnic groups in different ways, and as Anderson points out, 
sovereignty is an integral component of a nation-state. This interplay of vernacular and 
issues of sovereignty emphasize the dynamic nature of imagined communities and show 
that these communities are not always imagined in the same way. 
                                               
56 Jelavich, “Textbooks of the South Slavs,” 27 - 28.  
57 Ibid., 28. 
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memories, and in particular the way in which a nation remembers its participation in 
wars, play key roles in promoting nationalism.58 This is especially true in the case of the 
Balkans, whose history has sometimes been presented as a continual series of armed 
conflicts.59 Over time, most European nations phased out the depiction of war as a 
glorious and heroic event in favor of a more realistic picture of the human and social cost 
of wars. This trend was especially strong after World War II. As Jay Winter stated, “After 
Hiroshima and Auschwitz, the earlier commemorative efforts [of war as a glorious event] 
simply could not be duplicated.”60 Even so, the practice of minimizing heroic accounts in 
educational curricula was not adopted in Yugoslavia to any measurable degree. 
According to Wolfgang Hoepken, “Military conflicts [in Yugoslavia] remained heroic 
national liberation wars,” (particularly the anti-Ottoman wars) as well as a means 
providing legitimacy for the current government as was seen in the case of the Tito and 
his Partisans.61 In this way, education was incorporated into the program of official 
nationalism undertaken by Tito and the YLC—essentially the men running the Yugoslav 
government sought to build a sense of nationalism around the Civil War, an event in 
which they featured as heroes.62
                                               
58 Mojmir Križan claims that in Serbia during the period of Ottoman rule, epic folk poetry 
distorted and mythologized history in order to instill in the “illiterate and oppressed Serbs the indispensable 
level of self confidence.” Even at this early period, distortions of history were used to fortify the Serbs 
sense of community hundreds of years before the formal advent of nationalism. See: Križan, “New Serbian 
Nationalism,” 48. 
 
 59 Progress has been made by historians with regards to the examination of cultural memory. In 
1999, Wolfgang Hoepken suggested that an anthropological perspective is needed to determine how past 
wars are viewed in present-day social and political contexts and to what degree this is an exclusively 
Balkan tendency. Hoepken, “War, Memory, and Education,” 191. 
 60 Jay Winter Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 9. cited in Hoepken, “War, Memory, and Education,” 194. 
61 Hoepken, “War, Memory, and Education,” 194.  
 62 Benedict Anderson describes official nationalism as “from the start a conscious, self-protective 
policy, intimately linked to the preservation of imperial-dynastic interests…The one persistent feature of 
this style of nationalism was, and is, that it is official—i.e. something emanating from the state, and serving 
the interests of the state first and foremost.” Anderson, Imagined Communities, 145. 
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 Serbia never moved away from the concept of “war as a legitimate expression of 
politics,” according to Hoepken, and education continued “to show the legitimacy of war 
to fulfill national interests and to present wars as examples from the past of how to 
behave and how to defend those national interests.”63 The concept of legitimating 
violence applied at the lowest levels of villages and family structures at least as well as it 
did for the national government, but here it was more a matter of everyday life than of a 
formal education policy. For the Serbian peasant living in a Turkish empire, the use of 
violence not only guaranteed his claim to the land that he worked, it was also the best 
way to ensure that he would remain alive to work it. As Bogdan Denitch notes, “in these 
areas, which have been subject to prolonged violence, the adaptation of the family 
structures to the necessities of war and the expansion of kinship networks for the 
purposes of self-defense lasted into the twentieth century.”64  Evidence of these kinship 
networks and patterns of armed resistance are clearly evident in the strategy of the 
Chetnik (the Serbian nationalist) resistance movement in World War II. This strategy 
depended upon local leaders to do what they had always done—ensure the security of the 
local environs in which they lived and worked.65
 On a related note, the use of language in the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) 
bears mentioning. Despite constitutional provisions to the contrary and balanced 
recruitment throughout the republics and provinces, Serbian became the only language 
 
                                               
63 Hoepken, “War, Memory, and Education,” 193. 
64 Denitch, “Violence and Social Change,” 466. 
 65 A vivid account of the local impacts of the Chetnik resistance can be found in Charles Sudetic’s 
Blood and Vengeance. This narrative follows the history of the Čelik family living on Mount Zvijezda near 
Višegrad in Bosnia-Herzegovina from their immediate roots in the nineteenth century through the bloody 
wars of the 1990s. Sudetic provides compelling evidence that ethnic tensions, specifically memories of 
Chetnik and Ustasha brutality, were a natural part of life for Bosnian peasants—both Serb and Muslim. In 
these largely undeveloped regions recent memories of abuses were passed on to children along with the 
folktales that compose the cultural memory of the uneducated peasant populations. See: Charles Sudetic, 
Blood and Vengeance (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1998). 
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used by the YPA. The one concession made to the Croatians by the YPA on this subject 
was the uniform utilization of Latin script (as opposed to Cyrillic, which is the traditional 
script for the Serbian language).66 This situation was undoubtedly responsible for further 
inflaming tensions between Serbia and Croatia, Yugoslavia’s two most contentious 
republics. Bogdan Denitch in his book Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of 
Yugoslavia indicates that there was a disproportionate number of Serbs in the officer 
ranks of the YPA. He attributes this unbalance to the relative lack of economic 
opportunities available to Serbs as compared to Croats and Slovenes.67 This partially 
explains the loyalty of the YPA to Serbia, but it should not be overlooked that it was, 
above all, an extension of the central government. Omar Fisher notes that “in the pre-
collapse phase of the Yugoslav crisis the army was the only state institution capable of 
functioning, making an armed response virtually the only possible central response to 
centrifugal tendencies.”68
 Finally, the most important factor in the contemporary resurgence of Serbian 
nationalism was the work of the Serbian Academy of Science. In its 1986 Memorandum, 
the mode by which it communicated with the political community, the Academy 
proposed a nationalist political and economic campaign based upon an enumeration of 
Serbian grievances. It pointed to the “long-term lagging-behind in the development of the 
economy of Serbia,” the political discrimination against Serbs including under-
 In other words, it is not clear that the YPA was functioning as a 
Serbian Nationalist institution, at least not before 1991. 
                                               
66 Anton A. Bebler, “The Yugoslav People’s Army and the Fragmentation of a Nation,” Military 
Review 73, no. 8 (1993): 44. 
67 This trend of over-representation of officers from economically depressed areas of a country is 
not limited to Yugoslavia. Denitch points out the same trend among “Gascons and Corsicans in France, 
Highlanders in Great Britain, and Southerners in the Untied States.” Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism, 41.  
 68 Fisher, “Transition and Disruption,” 175. 
  
28 
representation and the relative inaccessibility of federal positions, and the “physical, 
political, legal, and cultural genocide of the Serbian population in Kosovo and 
Metohija.”69
“It the Serbian People see their future in the family of cultured and civilized nations of 
the world, they must find themselves anew and become a historical subject…they must 
put forth a modern societal program and national program, which will inspire 
contemporary and future generations.”
 Due to its role as a cultural institution, the Academy itself was incapable of 
directly effecting changes in policy, but nevertheless the memorandum warned,  
70
 
 
This memorandum lies at the core of the top-down, elite-led, self-pitying nationalism—
noted by scholars such as Ignatieff, Woodward, Bennett and Cohen—that swept through 
the Serbian masses in the late 1980s. Furthermore, the themes raised by the Academy are 
almost exactly the same as those adopted by Slobodan Milosevic. This implies that much 
of the historical consciousness of Serbian victimization evident in his speeches is a 
derivative of a similar trend among Serbian academics. 
 
The Rhetoric of Slobodan Milosevic 
 Perhaps the most central figure of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s is Slobodan 
Milosevic. He is characterized in the both in the western media and in  a large proportion 
of academic circles as a hard-line Serbian nationalist and is blamed for inflaming Serbian 
hegemonic sentiments among Serbs. 71
                                               
69 “Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences,” Denison Rusinow trans. in Stokes, From 
Stalinism to Pluralism, 275-77. Note: the second point refers to the fact that in spite of its greater 
population, Serbia had equal decision-making power in the federal government as each of the other 
republics. Essentially, this meant that a vote of a single Serbian citizen carried less weight than another 
Yugoslav citizen in any one of the other republics or either of the autonomous provinces. 
 It is the purpose of this investigation to neither 
70 Ibid., 280. 
71 As indicated in the section on the Historiography of Yugoslav Nationalism, Slobodan Milosevic 
is thought by many to be primarily responsible for the rise of Serbian nationalism which they maintain 
caused the violent breakup of Yugoslavia (See Silber and Little Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation). For this 
reason as well as charges of human rights abuses, Milosevic is currently standing trial before a war crimes 
tribunal in The Hague. For a list of the charges see: International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
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apologize for Milosevic nor further criticize him for any political, economic, or military 
aid that he gave Serbian nationalists, but rather to critically assess his use of history in his 
role as spokesman of Serbian nationalism. This will be accomplished through the analysis 
of a number of public speeches he made in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
 On April 24, 1987 Milosevic, at that time the party chief of the Serbian 
Communist Party, visited Pristina, Kosovo in place of the Serbian president Ivan 
Stambolić to meet with local Party leaders. Hearing the news of his visit a crowd of some 
10,000 Serbs and Montenegrins gathered to voice their complaints against the ethnic 
Albanians. They grew unruly, began throwing rocks, and were held at bay by Albanian 
police wielding rubber truncheons. In an attempt to defuse the situation, Milosevic 
delivered an impromptu speech, the most memorable line of which, “Nobody should dare 
to beat you,” became a rallying cry for Serbian nationalists in Kosovo. According to 
some accounts, this is where Milosevic reputedly launched his campaign for a broader 
program of Serbian nationalism. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia assembled by the United Nations claims in its indictment of Milosevic: 
In meetings with local Serb leaders and in a speech before a crowd of Serbs, Slobodan 
Milosevic endorsed a Serbian nationalist agenda. In so doing, he broke with the party and 
government policy which had restricted nationalist expression in the SFRY [Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] since the time of its founding by Josip Broz Tito after 
the Second World War. Thereafter, Slobodan Milosevic exploited a growing wave of 
Serbian nationalism in order to strengthen centralized rule in the SFRY.72
 
 
According to other accounts, however, Milosevic stumbled into his role as the preeminent 
Serbian nationalist and that “No one should dare to beat you” was, in fact, an off-hand 
remark made to the police, but interpreted by the crowd of Serbs as a promise to redress 
                                                                                                                                            
Yugoslavia. “Charges” Stuart D. Stein ed. http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/Kosovo/Kosovo-International%20 
Law12.htm (accessed May 31, 2005). 
72 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, “Indictment Section 6, ” Stuart D. 
Stein ed. http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/Kosovo/Kosovo-International_Law13.htm (accessed May 2, 2005). 
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their grievances against the Albanians that were steadily forcing them out of Kosovo. 
This speech did not incorporate references to specific historical events that characterized 
Milosevic’s later speeches, but did include statements such as “It was never part of the 
Serbian or Montenegrin character to give up in the face of obstacles, to demobilize when 
it’s time to fight,” and “You should stay here for the sake of your ancestors and 
descendants.” Regardless of whether this was a stroke of luck or a calculated move by 
Milosevic, he was enthroned as the protector of Serbs and catapulted to the forefront of 
the Serbian Nationalist movement.73
 In contrast, Milosevic’s famous speech commemorating the 600th anniversary of 
the battle of Kosovo, the battle against the Ottomans in which the Serbs lost their 
freedom, draws heavily on specific historical themes from beginning to end.
 
74 Even the 
location where the speech was delivered, the exact field, the “Plain of the Blackbird,” 
where the Battle of Kosovo was fought, was chosen for its historical significance. It is 
important to note that the speech was delivered in the context of rising tensions between 
the ethnically Serbian minority and the ethnically Albanian majority in the autonomous 
province of Kosovo.75
                                               
 73 Good discussions of this event and partial English translations of the speech can be found in 
both Silber and Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, 37-39 and Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling 
Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 233-
234. 
 The occasion itself attests to the importance of cultural memory to 
the Serbs. The event, a defeat 600 years past, is still cause for commemoration. In the 
speech Milosevic raises several themes, some of which were ostensibly intended to check 
 74 “Slobodan Milosevic’s 1989 St. Vitus Day Speech,” Gazimestan, June 28, 1989 http://www. 
slobodan-milosevic.org/spch-kosovo1989.htm. (accessed April 2, 2005) Until otherwise noted, all 
subsequent references to Milosevic’s speech are derived from this source. 
75 Mojmir Kiržan indicates that the problem faced by Serbs in Kosovo, namely, an “Albanian 
demographic expansion over the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, the central area of the defunct medieval 
Serbian state,” was already a problem in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In with this in mind, complaints 
made by Serbs and calls for Serbian hegemony in the late 1980s can be viewed as a reiteration of the same 
demands made in the 1930s. Kiržan, “New Serbian Nationalism,” 51. 
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Serbian nationalism. For instance he declares, “Serbia of today is united and equal to 
other republics … [it] has never had only Serbs living in it…This is not a disadvantage 
for Serbia. I am truly convinced that it is its advantage.” He goes on to describe in 
general terms the successes of other states in the international community that, like 
Serbia, are composed of “different nationalities, religions, and races.” 
 Over the course of the speech Milosevic stressed four themes. 1) The liberational 
nature of the Serbian national character; 2) the prospects for prosperity to be achieved 
through unity; 3) the national divisions that currently existed in Yugoslavia; and 4) the 
dignity—lost in their historic defeat—that would be regained by the achievement of 
national unity. The sub-text to each of these points might be better read as 1) Serbs have 
been victimized by others along ethnic lines but have not retaliated in kind; 2) Serbs will 
be more prosperous in a purely Serbian state, or at least a state committed to a Serbian 
agenda; 3) Serbs should not forget the historical and potential dangers posed by the other 
Yugoslav peoples, and especially the minorities in the autonomous province of Kosovo; 
and 4) Serbia lost its position as a European nation (thereby losing its dignity) when it 
was conquered by the Ottomans, and losing authority over the ethnic Albanians in 
Kosovo presents the potential for a similar disgrace. A textual analysis supports these 
claims. 
 Milosevic admits that it is essentially impossible to know what actually occurred 
at the battle of Kosovo, but that what is most significant is the way in which the battle has 
been remembered by Serbs—as a moral victory and as a necessary military defeat 
suffered by the Serbs in defense of European culture. This glimmer of sensitivity for 
historical integrity doesn’t stop him from blaming Serbia’s loss on “lack of unity and 
  
32 
betrayal.” This claim allows Milosevic to make a rhetorical leap across the centuries to 
connect the “lack of unity and betrayal” that plagued Serbia at the battle of Kosovo to the 
“lack of unity and betrayal” that characterized the opposing Serbian resistance 
movements during World War II. The association of the two events implies that Serbia 
also lost the Civil War between the Chetniks and Partisans. This reinforces the 
remembered feelings of embarrassment and disillusionment felt by many Serbs after the 
War. The communist party’s policy of “brotherhood and unity” prohibited the emergence 
of Serbian hegemony in spite of both the numerical superiority of Serbs that participated 
in the resistance movements during the Civil War when compared to other Yugoslav 
ethnic groups and their privileged position in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia during the 
interwar period. Essentially, the harm caused to Serbia by forty years of maintaining the 
pretenses of friendship and equality with the Croatia, “in the historical and moral sense, 
exceeded fascist aggression.” 
 Embarrassment at the failure of the Chetniks is artfully transformed into the virtue 
or Partisan victory as Milosevic expounds the altruistic character of the Serbs. This 
passage is potent enough that it bears reproduction in full: 
[Serbian] national and historical being has been liberational throughout the whole of 
history and through two world wars, as it is today. They liberated themselves and when 
they could they also helped others to liberate themselves. The fact that in this region they 
are a major nation is not a Serbian sin or shame; this is an advantage which they have not 
used against others, but I must say that here, in this big, legendary field of Kosovo, the 
Serbs have not used the advantage of being great for their own benefit either. 
 
The first sentence shows the historical consciousness common to the Serbian people, that 
is, the perceived concurrence of ancient, recent, and present events. The second sentence 
boasts of two facts: First, that Serbia obtained its independence from the Ottomans before 
attempting to wrest Croatia away the Hapsburgs; and second, that it was the mostly 
Serbian Partisans who succeeded in expelling the fascists of all types at the end of World 
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War II.76
 Milosevic’s second theme focuses on the economic and social victimization of the 
Serbian republic within Yugoslavia. While it is true that Serbia historically lagged behind 
the more advanced republics of Croatia in terms of economic prosperity, especially 
industrialization, Milosevic completely ignores the fact that Croatia and Slovenia were 
already more industrialized than Serbia in 1918. This is one of the reasons that Croats and 
Slovenes have traditionally viewed Serbia as backward which can be construed as means 
of victimizing the Serbs socially.
 The last lines of the passage are a call to Serbs in Kosovo to resist 
discrimination and pressures to emigrate coming from the ethnically Albanian majority, 
and a warning to that majority that those same Serbs have the ability, indeed the moral 
responsibility to stand up for themselves. Milosevic goes on to declare Serbs free of the 
“vassal mentality” that was imposed upon them by the Ottomans and later by Tito. His 
speech omits the words “Ottomans” and “Tito,” but the implication for an audience of 
discontented Serbs is clear. 
77
                                               
 76 Military historians argue about how successful the Partisan movement would have been in its 
efforts to liberate Yugoslavia without the help of the Soviet Army. On one hand the very possibility of a 
communist revolution in Yugoslavia in the midst of World War II required that the allied powers be 
victorious. On the other hand the Partisans were still largely confined to the mountainous regions of 
Yugoslavia until the arrival of the Soviets. For an in-depth, balanced discussion of this issue see: Paul 
Shoup, “The Yugoslav Revolution: The First of a New Type,” Studies on the Soviet Union 11, no. 4 (1971): 
215-43. 
 Essentially, Milosevic is reminding Serbs that they 
should be jealous of economic favors given to the northern republics by the Hapsburgs 
that the Ottomans failed to deliver in the south. What follows, however, is difficult to 
label as outright nationalism and this probably accounts for much of the potential defense 
for the former Serbian president against charges of rashly promoting nationalism.  
 77 This also accounts for why Croats and Slovenes, in particular, tend to oppose Serbian hegemony 
so fiercely. 
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 According to Milosevic, Serbia is enriched by is various ethnicities, and the fact 
that the most developed and prosperous countries in the world are multi-ethnic serves as 
his supporting evidence. In fact, he suggests that “the only differences one can and should 
allow in socialism are between hard working people and idlers and between honest 
people and dishonest people.” This seems to be a departure from the earlier arguments 
presented, but the possibility that Milosevic is making a legitimate call for the peaceful 
coexistence of Serbs and Albanians in the autonomous province of Kosovo, as well as the 
fair treatment of Serbs in the other republics, should not be completely discounted. It 
must also be remembered that his entire political career had been tied to the Communist 
Party of Serbia. Given this fact and the date of the speech (June 28, 1989, i.e. before the 
general dissolution of Yugoslavia’s communist parties following the free elections in 
1990), it was to be expected that Milosevic would mix traditional Socialist rhetoric with 
his relatively new nationalist message.  For the purposes of this investigation, however, it 
is noteworthy that—besides indicating the fact that Serbia has never been entirely 
populated by ethnic Serbs—Milosevic’s arguments for peace and toleration are devoid of 
the strong historical links that characterize the more nationalist sections of this speech. 
This trend is borne out in most his discussion concerning the significant national 
differences that divided Yugoslavia. At this point, in 1989, Milosevic was at least willing 
to give lip service to the idea that nationalism was the strongest divisive force that was 
then threatening the stability of Yugoslavia. It is interesting though that he distinguishes 
between national divisions and “social, cultural, religious and many other less important 
ones,” when most accounts of ethnic nationalism in the former Yugoslavia include a 
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discussion of the social, cultural, and most especially the religious components of that 
nationalism.78
 The St. Vitus Day speech comes full circle to the Battle of Kosovo. The closing 
paragraphs contain perhaps the most ominous messages of the speech, but all are 
concealed in the subtext. Milosevic reminds his audience yet again that although the true 
story of the Battle of Kosovo cannot be known, all Serbians remember—or at least 
should remember—that it was disunity that led to their defeat. This strongly implies a 
threat directed at the Albanian majority against being disunited with Serbia proper (that 
is, Kosovar Albanians should abandon any thoughts of seceding from Serbia). This threat 
is made all but explicit by Milosevic’s comment that “Six centuries later, now, we are 
being again engaged in battles and are facing battles. They are not armed battles, 
although such things cannot be excluded yet.” The Serbs are thus, in effect, given the 
authority by their president to engage in armed resistance to discrimination against them. 
This completely contradicts his earlier rhetoric promoting the virtues of peaceful 
coexistence and toleration. Finally, by having fought (and lost) the Battle of Kosovo, 
Serbia proved itself “the bastion that defended the European culture, religion, and 
European society in general.” This claim is meant to reinforce the legitimacy of Serbian 
nationalism. It asserts that Serbia is a part of Europe; that Serbia is not culturally inferior 
to their neighbors to the north; and that, in fact, the rest of Europe owes them a 600 year 
old debt of gratitude for slowing the Turkish advance into Europe. The themes of this 
famous speech return in several of Milosevic’s later speeches. 
  
                                               
 78 For instance see: Cohen Broken Bonds 4-8; Denitch, Ethnic Natioanlism, 29; and Woodward, 
Balkan Tragedy, 22-24. 
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 After the dissolution of the YLC in 1990, Milosevic formed the Socialist Party of 
Serbia (SPS).79
bureaucratic arbitrariness, equalization of the state and the party, violence, economic 
inertia, cultural isolation, aggressive intolerance of a different political opinion, long-
standing hostility towards educated people and the new blindness for the concerns of 
workers and farmers, inclination to nurture the personality cult at all levels, cruel political 
hierarchy and cowardice.
 In his closing remarks at the first congress of the SPS on July 18, 1990 he 
reiterated points from his St. Vitus Day speech that blamed Tito’s reign as well as other 
historical circumstances for the sorry state of Serbian affairs. These points are 
enumerated as follows:  
80
 
 
The first point is a direct and fairly accurate criticism of the manner in which Tito ran 
Yugoslavia.81 The second refers to the constitutional reforms of 1974 that granted all the 
federal republics and Serbia’s two autonomous provinces equal representation in the 
federal government as the Republic of Serbia itself.82
                                               
 79 A good discussion of the creation of new political parties in all the republics, including the 
emergence of the SPS in Serbia, can be found in Cohen, Broken Bonds, 102-07. 
 “Economic inertia” refers to the 
above-noted historical differences in patterns of industrialization between the 
Northwestern and Southeastern zones of Yugoslavia. Political intolerance typified the 
Yugoslav government from its creation in 1918. It further eroded Milosevic’s credibility 
that he suggested that his government would somehow create a solution for this problem, 
as did his condemning Tito’s personality cult, as he was deeply involved in the process of 
manufacturing his own. The fact that Milosevic drew attention to the issue of 
“longstanding hostility towards educated people” is more problematic. On one hand this 
 80 “Closing Statement at the First SPS Congress, Speech by Slobodan Milošević – Chairman of 
the SPS,” July 18, 1990. http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/sps1.htm (accessed April 13, 2005) 
 81 Until his death in 1980, Tito maintained the power to personally reconcile conflicts between the 
republics in spite of the fact that by that time most of the powers of government were supposed to have 
been turned over to the republics.  
 82 The changes enacted by the 1974 constitution marked another substantial step towards the 
decentralization of political and economic authority, unprecedented in any socialist society. See Cohen, 
Broken Bonds, 33. 
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was likely a promise for improved relations with the members of the Serbian Academy of 
the Science from whom Milosevic inherited many of the arguments that supported his 
nationalist program. On the other hand, it alludes to the Chetnik practice of killing the 
rural intelligentsia (see note 25), and makes sense given that Milosevic is the heir of the 
communist political tradition—which also accounts for his professed concern for workers 
and farmers. What is confusing, however, is the invocation of this negative image 
associated with a Serbian nationalist group, the image of ignorant peasants killing rural 
school-teachers, in the process of promoting a Serbian nationalist program. This 
illustrates how Milosevic successfully employed positive Serbian cultural memories of 
the Chetniks and Partisan to gain support while largely avoiding the stigmas associated 
with both.  
 In his address to the Serbian Assembly on May 30, 1991, Milosevic “drew the 
line” on the Kosovo issue. He refused to engage in further discussion of creating an 
Albanian state in the province of Kosovo. His exact words were, “I will not agree to 
justify to anyone why the Republic of Serbia is not allowing the Serbs and Montenegrins 
in Kosovo-Metohija to be killed again and why we are not willing to conduct dialogue on 
the possibility of creating an Albanian state on the territory of Serbia.” 83
                                               
 83 “Slobodan Milosevic on the Future of Yugoslavia,” (Belgrade home service, The British 
Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 30, 1991) http://www.slobodan-
milosevic.org/news/milosevic053091.htm (accessed April 13, 2005). Following quotations are taken from 
the same source until otherwise noted. 
 In this refusal 
two separate events occurred. First was the refusal to create an Albanian state, but the 
second (and more significant for the purposes of this paper) is a declaration that the 
creation of an Albanian state would necessarily entail the murder of Serbs and 
Montenegrins. This second point is an extension of the position that initially gained 
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Milosevic his popularity in 1987, as well as a declaration that the future will resemble the 
past—that it is somehow part of the Albanian character to continue the abuses against the 
Serbs in Kosovo of the 1980s, the 1930s and even the of the Ottoman Turks in the 
fourteenth century. Milosevic made his resolve clear on this issue by declaring, “I want to 
openly say that everyone who demands a deviation from the stands on these issues can 
only achieve this by bringing down the present leadership of Serbia.” In retrospect it can 
be said that with this statement Milosevic closed the door to debate and diplomacy and 
threw the entire weight of the Yugoslav military behind a Serbian nationalist view of 
history. 
 In this same address, Milosevic moves beyond the Kosovo issue to the question of 
Serbs in other Republics, specifically Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, in what is 
arguably one of his most logical arguments and legitimate uses of historical facts and 
precedents. Until the formal recognition of these two republics by the international 
community the right of self-determination of Serbs living outside Serbia, at least in those 
areas where they constituted a local majority was an undecided issue. Milosevic 
characteristically presented the issue in terms of absolutes. He declared, “It is an 
undisputable fact that the right of a people to self-determination in a multinational state 
cannot be territorially limited to existing administrative borders between republics.” 
What follows this absolute is, at least on the surface, a compelling argument in favor of 
self-determination. 
The borders between the republics within Yugoslavia have never been state borders. It is 
well-known that they were drawn in the past arbitrarily and without objective criteria - 
that is, disregarding the ethnic composition of the population, the consequences of the 
genocide suffered by the Serbian people, or the norms of international law. 
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The first statement is a point of contention for the Croats (see note 17), but it is true that 
Yugoslavia in its first incarnation was formed by the Treaty of Versailles—largely 
without regard for the right of self-determination described in Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” 
that were supposed to have guided the creation of new national borders following World 
War I 84—using existing Hapsburg and Ottoman administrative borders. These provincial 
borders within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, although carried over into the Socialist 
Federation of Yugoslavia, were never intended to be definitive borders between ethnic 
groups.85
 Therefore, the right to self-determination cannot be reserved only for a majority people 
in a nationally-mixed republic. If that were so, the interests of those peoples who 
constitute a smaller number in a part of Yugoslav territory within the borders of 
individual republics would be violated on the pretext of civil democracy. 
 Milosevic’s reference to the “genocide suffered by the Serbian people” serves 
as evidence of the evils associated with constructing an ethnically pure state along 
arbitrary political boundaries. These arguments lead him to conclude,  
 
Regardless of the actual conduct of the wars in the following years—specifically the 
ethnic cleansing carried out by Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina—it must be acknowledged 
that Milosevic, in this case, presented a sound argument intended to safeguard the rights 
                                               
 84 Specifically points X and XI. Point X states, “The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place 
among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to 
autonomous development.” Similarly, point XI states. “Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be 
evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations 
of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established 
lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence 
and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.” Woodrow Wilson, “Fourteen 
Points Speech” in Arthur S. Link et al., eds., The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 45 (1984), 536. 
http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/51.htm (accessed May 30, 2005). 
 85 In fact, one of the grievances of the Serbs in the Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia was that 
large numbers of Serbs were deprived of representation because of the way in which the borders were 
drawn between the republics and, especially, the autonomous provinces within the republic of Serbia. See: 
Križan, “New Serbian Nationalism,” 54-56. 
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of individuals throughout Yugoslavia based upon mostly accurate historical 
information.86
 By the closing statements of the Second congress of the SPS on October 24, 1992, 
there were no more appeals or references made to history.
  
87
 
 The implications of this fact 
are unclear. It could be that such appeals were no longer effective so far as reinforcing 
the legitimacy of the Milosevic government was concerned, or simply that the war at 
hand provided it with more immediate examples of crimes against Serbs with which to 
promote Serbian nationalist interests. 
 
Conclusions 
 It seems almost elementary to state that nationalist rhetoric, like that employed by 
Slobodan Milosevic, tends to utilize rose-colored histories to link heroic images of the 
past to the present day, while carefully omitting accounts of wrong-doings committed by 
the state that might be cause for national guilt. In this case, two specific events dominate 
the Serbian historical consciousness: The loss of the battle of Kosovo in 1389 and the 
victimization of the Serbs at the hands of the Ustasha and Partisans during the civil war 
between 1941 and 1945. Even so, appealing to larger-than-life conflicts in a nation’s past 
in order to win support for contemporary struggles is not a practice unique to Serbia. 
                                               
 86 Given the other evidence presented in this argument by Milosevic, it is interesting that he did 
not draw attention to the Helsinki Final Act (HFA),of which Yugoslavia was a signatory, specifically 
sections 1(a)III and 1(a)IV that guarantee the Inviolability of Frontiers and the Territorial Integrity of States 
respectively. On the other hand, considering the gross violations of human rights in Yugoslavia in the 
1990s—the defense of which had already become the primary function of the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) which was born out of the HFA—and the rampant intervention, both 
military and political, by foreign powers, it is clear that the provisions of the HFA were almost completely 
disregarded in dealings with and within Yugoslavia in the 1990s. For a full text of the HFA see: Conference 
on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act (1975) http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1975/08 
/4044_en.pdf (accessed May 31, 2005). 
 87 Closing Statement at the Second SPS Congress, Speech by Slobodan Milošević – Chairman of 
the SPS,” (October 24, 1992), http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/ sps2.htm (accessed April 13, 2005). 
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What is notable about the case of Serbia in particular is that almost all of its historical 
consciousness is built around episodes of victimization with a 500 year gap between 
significant events. Milosevic, however, should not bear the full weight of the blame for 
creating this victim mentality among Serbs. To a certain extent, it already existed among 
the largely uneducated masses (like the members of the Čelik family in Sudetic’s Blood 
and Vengence), but its forceful revival must be attributed to politically sensitive and 
historically aware members of the elite—in other words, people like the members of the 
Serbian Academy of Sciences. These two groups, essentially characterized by the “Elite” 
and the “Peasant,” have very different views on history. These views are intimately 
connected to the problems resulting from the repression of a balanced public scholarly 
discourse of important events in Yugoslavia, especially the Civil War of the 1940s, and 
the lack of reconciliation between ethnic groups.  
 The view of history held by the Elite was capable of cataloguing and analyzing 
the specific nature of historical events in much the same way as this paper has attempted 
to do. Memory of specifics—for instance, the progressively anti-Serbian demographic 
trend in Albania, the relative rate of Serbia’s economic grow in comparison to the other 
republics, or the total number of Serbs killed by the Ustasha—belong to a select group of 
individuals including the members of the Serbian Academy of Sciences. This group was 
also capable of tailoring accounts of history to foster nationalism in service of specific 
political agendas.88
                                               
 88 This sometimes included a redefinition of the imagined limits of the community. For example, 
by emphasizing the similarities between the various Slavic groups and historical examples of cooperation 
among the same, Tito attempted to foster a sense of Yugoslav nationalism. In contrast, Milosevic inspired 
Serbian nationalism by emphasizing historic examples of the victimization of Serbs. 
 Slobodan Milosevic was perhaps the best example of this type of 
individual.  
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 Conversely, for the Peasant history is mostly limited to folk legends and familial 
experiences. Folk histories generally have heroes, villains, and a clear sense of morality, 
and it is for this reason precisely that Milosevic’s nationalist speeches include accounts of 
the Battle of Kosovo and the “Serbian character.” His rhetoric appealed to the masses 
because it was devoid of all the ambiguities with which the elite were concerned. An 
average Serbian villager in Bosnia-Herzegovina was not likely to care about the political 
differences between the Chetniks and the Partisans if he knew (or believed) that a 
member of the Ustasha killed his father and uncles. Before these people were bombarded 
by the media with nationalist rhetoric, they lived with inter-ethnic tensions at the 
individual level but were unable (or unwilling) to vent them. This is precisely why the 
political policy of official nationalism became especially violent in the ethnically mixed 
rural areas of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Essentially, politics lit the fuse on a bomb 
of ethnic tensions that had never been defused through a policy of reconciliation 
following the Civil War of the 1940s. In fact, Tito’s “Brotherhood and Unity” policy 
deliberately turned a blind eye on the issue of ethnic tensions.  
 From an objective (or at least non-Yugoslav) standpoint it should be noted, that 
the lack of positive cultural memories shared by a majority of the Yugoslav peoples 
likely precluded the creation of a viable multi-ethnic state. At the beginning of the 
twentieth century, Croatia and Serbia, which would become the most contentious of the 
federal republics, shared no common history. Each had been dominated by a different 
empire for over half a millennium. By the end of the twentieth century this fact had 
changed and the two republics shared a history of seventy years of political wrangling for 
power in the various manifestations of the Yugoslav government. Even more detrimental 
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to the prospect of Yugoslav unity was the fact that Croatian fascists and Serbian 
traditionalists fought on opposite sides of a horribly brutal war, a war that both lost to the 
Partisans who did not allow their victory to be claimed by either national group. Neither 
Tito nor Milosevic nor any other nationalist politician was ever able to conjure up a 
convincing account that acknowledged Yugoslavia’s multitude of historical tribulations 
and still tied Serbs, Croats, Albanians, Bosnians, Slovenians, and all the other ethnic 
groups together in a positive way. 
 What emerges from this investigation is not so much a caution against omission 
of national guilt by ideologically motivated politicians or even against the abuse of 
history, but rather a warning against the naïve attempt to foster nationalist sentiments 
among peoples who never shared common historical experiences or that share a history 
of abuse and victimization. This point is particularly relevant when one considers current 
nation-building efforts that are taking place all over the world today. After all, if Croats, 
Bosnians, and Serbs cannot share a sense of nationalism that bridges their distinct cultural 
traditions, cannot imagine themselves as a community despite their ethnic differences, 
how can the world expect other multi-ethnic states, for instance, Iraq—a state composed 
of Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites—to succeed?  
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